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R A N K I N G T H E O RY Franz Huber
In epistemology ranking theory is a theory of belief and its revision.
It studies how an ideal doxastic agent should organize her beliefs and
conditional beliefs at a given moment in time, and how she should revise
her beliefs and conditional beliefs across time when she receives new
information. In this entry I will first present some background, most
notably the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, &
Makinson, 1985). In order to motivate the introduction of ranking theory I
will then focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions. After presenting
the elements of ranking theory (Spohn, 1988, 2012) I will show how this
theory solves the problem of iterated belief revisions. I will conclude by
sketching two areas of future research and by mentioning applications
of ranking theory outside epistemology. Along the way we will see how
ranking theory, a theory of belief, compares to subjective probability theory
or Bayesianism, which is a theory of partial beliefs or degrees of belief.
1 introduction
Sophia believes many things, among others that it will rain on Tuesday,
that it will be sunny on Wednesday, and that weather forecasts are always
right. Belief revision theory tells Sophia how to revise her beliefs when
she learns that the weather forecast for Tuesday and Wednesday predicts
rain. As we will see, this depends on the details of her beliefs, but under
one way of filling in the details she should keep her belief that it will rain
on Tuesday and give up her belief that it will be sunny on Wednesday. To
state in full detail how Sophia should revise her beliefs when she learns
new information we need a representation of her old beliefs and of the
new information she receives.
In this entry I will focus on ideal doxastic agents who do not suffer
from the computational and other physical limitations of ordinary doxastic
agents such as people and computer programs. These ideal doxastic agents
get to voluntarily decide what to believe (and to what degree of numerical
precision); they never forget any of their (degrees of) beliefs; and they
always believe all logical and conceptual truths (to a maximal degree).
We may perhaps define a (doxastic or cognitive) agent to be ideal just in
case any (cognitive) action that is physically possible is an action that is
possible for her. Such ideal agents ought to do exactly that which they
ought to do if they could, where the ‘can’ that is hidden in the ‘could’
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expresses possibility for the agent, not metaphysical possibility. Hence the
principle that Ought Implies Can does not put any constraints on what an
ideal agent should do, and on what an ideal doxastic agent should believe.
Belief revision theory models belief as a qualitative attitude towards
sentences or propositions: the ideal doxastic agent believes a proposition,
or she disbelieves the proposition by believing its negation, or she sus-
pends judgment with respect to the proposition and its negation. This
is different from the theory of subjective probabilities, also known as
Bayesianism (Easwaran 2011a, 2011b; Titelbaum, this volume; Weisberg
2011; Wenmackers, this volume), where belief is modeled as a quantita-
tive attitude towards a proposition: the ideal doxastic agent believes a
proposition to a specific degree, her degree of belief, or credence, for the
proposition. However, we will see that, in order to adequately model con-
ditional beliefs and iterated belief revisions, ranking theory also models
the ideal agent’s doxastic state with numbers, and thus more than just the
set of propositions she believes. Genin (this volume) discusses the relation
between belief and degree of belief.
2 belief revision
Spohn (1988, 1990) develops ranking theory in order to fix a problem
that besets the AGM theory of belief revision. In order to provide some
background for ranking theory I will first present the AGM theory. Ranking
theory will then arise naturally out of the AGM theory. The latter theory
derives its name from the seminal paper by Alchourrón et al. (1985).
Comprehensive overviews can be found in Gärdenfors (1988), Gärdenfors
and Rott (1995), Rott (2001), and Lin (this volume).
One version of the AGM theory of belief revision represents the ideal
doxastic agent’s old beliefs, her doxastic state at a given moment in time, by
a set of sentences from some formal language, her belief set, together with
an entrenchment ordering over these sentences. The entrenchment ordering
represents how firmly the ideal doxastic agent holds the beliefs in her
belief set. It represents the details of the ideal agent’s doxastic state. The
new information is represented by a single sentence. The AGM theory
distinguishes between the easy case, called expansion, and the general case,
called revision. In expansion the new information does not contradict the
ideal doxastic agent’s old belief set and is simply added. In revision the
new information may contradict the ideal doxastic agent’s old belief set.
The general case of revision is difficult, because the ideal doxastic agent
has to turn her old belief set, which is assumed to be consistent, into a new
belief set that contains the new information and is consistent. Usually the
general case is dealt with in two steps. In a first step, called contraction, the
old belief set is cleared of everything that contradicts the new information.
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In a second step one simply expands by adding the new information. This
means that the difficult doxastic task is handled by contraction, which
turns the general case of revision into the easy case of expansion.
A formal language L is defined inductively, or recursively, as follows. L
contains the contradictory sentence p⊥q and all elements of a countable
set of propositional variables PV = {pPq, pQq, pRq, . . .}. Furthermore,
whenever A and B are sentences of L, then so are the negations of A and
of B, p¬Aq and p¬Bq, respectively, as well as the conjunction of A and B,
p(A ∧ B)q. Finally, nothing else is a sentence of L. The new information
is represented by a single sentence A from L. The ideal agent’s doxastic
state is represented by a set of sentences, her belief set B ⊆ L, plus
an entrenchment ordering  for B. The entrenchment ordering, which
represents the details of the ideal doxastic agent’s beliefs, orders the
agent’s beliefs according to how reluctant she is to give them up: the more
entrenched a belief, the more reluctant she is to give it up.
The entrenchment ordering does most of the work in a revision of the
agent’s beliefs. Suppose the agent receives new information that contra-
dicts her belief set. Since the new belief set that results from the revision
has to be consistent, some of the old beliefs have to go. The entrenchment
ordering determines which beliefs have to go first: the least entrenched be-
liefs are the beliefs that have to go first. If giving up those is not enough to
restore consistency, the beliefs that are next in the entrenchment ordering
have to go next. And so on. The beliefs that would be given up last are the
most entrenched ones. According to Maximality, they are the tautological
sentences, which are always believed and never given up, because doing so
cannot restore consistency. On the other end of the spectrum are the least
entrenched sentences. According to Minimality, they are the sentences the
agent does not even believe to begin with. These sentences do not belong
to the agent’s belief set and so are gone before the revision process has
even begun.
If one sentence logically implies another sentence, then, according to
Dominance, the latter cannot be more entrenched than the former, as
giving up the belief in the latter sentence is to also give up the belief in
the former sentence. Dominance implies that the entrenchment ordering
is reflexive: every sentence is at least as entrenched as itself. According to
Conjunctivity, two sentences cannot both be more entrenched than their
conjunction: one cannot give up one’s belief in a conjunction without
giving up one’s belief in at least one of the conjuncts. In combination
with Dominance, Conjunctivity implies that the entrenchment ordering
is connected: any two sentences can be compared to each other in terms
of their comparative entrenchment. That is, either the first sentence is at
least as entrenched as the second sentence, or the second sentence is at
least as entrenched as the first sentence, or both. Finally, to ensure that the
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entrenchment ordering is a well-behaved ordering relation, it is assumed
to be transitive by Transitivity.
More precisely, where ` is the logical consequence relationship on L
and Cn (B) = {A ∈ L : B ` A} is the set of logical consequences of B
(and ∅ is the empty set {}), the entrenchment ordering has to satisfy the
following postulates. For all sentences A, B, and C from L:
1. If A  B and B  C, then A  C. Transitivity
2. If {A} ` B, then A  B. Dominance
3. A  A ∧ B or B  A ∧ B. Conjunctivity
4. Suppose B 6` ⊥. Then A /∈ B if, and only if,
for all B ∈ L: A  B. Minimality
5. If A  B for all A ∈ L, then ∅ ` B. Maximality
The work that is done by the entrenchment ordering in a revision of
the agent’s beliefs can also be described differently in terms of expansion,
revision, and contraction, which turn belief sets and new information
into belief sets (see Caie, this volume). Formally they are functions from
℘(L)×L into ℘(L).
Expansion +˙ turns each old belief set B ⊆ L and each sentence A
from L into a new belief set B+˙A = Cn (B ∪ {A}). This is the easy case
described earlier about which there is little more to be said.
The difficult and more interesting case is revision ∗, which turns each
old belief set B ⊆ L and each sentence A from L into a new belief set
B ∗ A. The operator ∗ is required to satisfy a number of postulates.
Closure requires revised belief sets to be closed under the logical conse-
quence relation: after the revision is completed, the agent ought to believe
all (and only) the logical consequences of the revised belief set. Congru-
ence is similar in spirit to Closure and requires that it is the content of the
new information received, and not its particular formulation, that deter-
mines what is added, and what is removed, from the agent’s belief set in
a revision. Success requires that revising a belief set by new information
succeeds in adding the new information to the agent’s belief set—and,
given Closure, all sentences it logically implies. Consistency requires the
revised belief set to be consistent as long as the new information is consis-
tent. The remaining postulates all formulate different aspects of the idea
that, when revising her belief set by new information, the agent should
add and remove as few beliefs as possible from her belief set, subject to
the constraints that the resulting belief set is consistent and that the new
information has been added successfully.
Inclusion requires that revising a belief set does not create any new
beliefs that are not also created by simply adding the new information. In
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a sense it says that expansion is a special case of revision. Preservation
requires that revising a belief set by new information that does not con-
tradict the agent’s old belief set does not lead to the loss of any beliefs.
Conjunction 1 requires that, when revising her belief set by a conjunction,
the agent adds only beliefs that she also adds when first revising her belief
set by one of the two conjuncts, and then adding the second conjunct.
Conjunction 2 requires that, when revising her belief set by a conjunction,
the agent adds all beliefs that she adds when first revising her belief set by
one of the two conjuncts, and then adding the second conjunct—provided
the second conjunct is consistent with the result of revising her belief set
by the first conjunct. More precisely, a revision function has to satisfy the
following postulates. For all sets of sentences B ⊆ L and all sentences A
and B from L:
∗1. B ∗ A = Cn (B ∗ A). Closure
∗2. A ∈ B ∗ A. Success
∗3. B ∗ A ⊆ Cn (B ∪ {A}). Inclusion
∗4. If B 6` ¬A, then B ⊆ B ∗ A. Preservation
∗5. If {A} ` B and {B} ` A, then B ∗ A = B ∗ B. Congruence
∗6. If ∅ 6` ¬A, then ⊥ 6∈ B ∗ A. Consistency
∗7. B ∗ (A ∧ B) ⊆ Cn ((B ∗ A) ∪ {B}). Conjunction 1
∗8. If ¬B 6∈ B ∗ A, then
Cn
(
(B ∗ A) ∪ {B}) ⊆ B ∗ (A ∧ B). Conjunction 2
The two-step view of revision described previously is known as the Levi
identity (Levi, 1977). It has the ideal doxastic agent first contract .− her
old belief set B by the negation of the new information, ¬A, thus making
it consistent with the new information (as well as everything logically
implied by the new information). Then it has her expand the result B .−¬A
by adding the new information A:
B ∗ A = Cn ((B .−¬A) ∪ {A}) .
The Levi identity puts contraction center stage in the revision process.
Contraction .− turns each old belief set B ⊆ L and each sentence A from L
into a “reduced” belief set B .− A that is cleared of A as well as everything
logically implying A. It is required to satisfy the following postulates. For
all sets of sentences B ⊆ L and all sentences A and B from L:
.−1. B .− A = Cn (B .− A). Closure
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.−2. If ∅ 6` A, then A 6∈ Cn (B .− A). Success
.−3. B .− A ⊆ Cn (B). Inclusion
.−4. If B 6` A, then B .− A = B. Vacuity
.−5. If {A} ` B and {B} ` A, then B .− A = B .− B. Congruence
.−6. Cn (B) ⊆ Cn ((B .− A) ∪ {A}). Recovery
.−7. (B .− A) ∩ (B .− B) ⊆ B .− (A ∧ B). Conjunction 1
.−8. If A 6∈ B .− (A ∧ B), then B .− (A ∧ B) ⊆ B .− A. Conjunction 2
Closure requires contracted belief sets to be closed under the logical
consequence relation: after the contraction is completed, the agent ought
to believe all (and only) the logical consequences of the contracted belief set.
Congruence is similar in spirit to Closure and requires that it is the content
of the sentence to be removed, and not its particular formulation, that
determines what is removed from the agent’s belief set in a contraction.
Success requires that contracting a belief set by a sentence that is not
tautological succeeds in removing this sentence from a belief set—and,
given Closure, all sentences logically implying it. Inclusion requires that
contracting a belief set does not add any beliefs to the belief set. The
remaining postulates all formulate different aspects of the idea that, when
contracting her belief set by a sentence, the agent should remove as few
beliefs as possible from her belief set, subject to the constraints that the
resulting belief set is consistent and that the sentence to be removed,
together with all sentences logically implying it, is removed successfully.
Vacuity requires that contracting a belief set by a sentence leaves the
belief set unchanged if the sentence that was to be removed was not even
part of the belief set to begin with. Recovery requires that contracting a
belief set by a sentence removes as few beliefs as possible so that adding
the removed sentence again afterwards allows the agent to recover all her
previously removed beliefs. Conjunction 1 requires that, when contracting
her belief set by a conjunction, the agent does not remove any beliefs that
she does not also remove when contracting by one or the other of the two
conjuncts alone. Finally, Conjunction 2 requires the following: if a conjunct
is removed in contracting a belief set by a conjunction, then no belief gets
removed in contracting the belief set by this conjunct that does not also
get removed in contracting this belief set by the entire conjunction. The
idea behind the last two postulates is that giving up one of its conjuncts
is all the ideal doxastic agent needs to do in order to give up an entire
conjunction.
The Levi identity turns each contraction operator .− satisfying .−1 – .−8
into a revision operator ∗ satisfying ∗1 – ∗8. The converse is true of the
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Harper identity (Harper, 1976). The latter has the ideal doxastic agent first
revise the old belief set B by the negation of the new information, ¬A.
Then it has her remove everything from the result B ∗ ¬A that was not
already also a logical consequence of the old belief set B:
B .− A = (B ∗ ¬A) ∩ Cn (B) .
If we have a belief set B ⊆ L we can use an entrenchment ordering  for
B to define a revision operator ∗ for L as follows. For every sentence A
from L:
B ∗ A = Cn ({B ∈ L : ¬A ≺ B} ∪ {A}) ,
where A ≺ B holds if, and only if, A  B and B 6 A.
The idea behind this equation is the following. When the ideal doxastic
agent revises ∗ her old belief set B by the new information A she first
has to clear B of ¬A as well as everything else that is as entrenched
as, or less entrenched than, ¬A. For instance, B also has to be cleared
of everything that logically implies ¬A. However, it follows from the
definition of an entrenchment ordering that all sentences B from the ideal
doxastic agent’s old belief set B that are more entrenched than ¬A can
be preserved. This gives us the “preserved” belief set {B ∈ L : ¬A ≺ B}.
Then the ideal doxastic agent adds the new information A to obtain
{B ∈ L : ¬A ≺ B} ∪ {A}. Finally she adds all sentences that are logically
implied by the preserved belief set together with the new information. As
shown by Gärdenfors (1988) and Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) one can
then prove
Theorem 1 Let L be a formal language. For each set of sentences B ⊆ L and
each entrenchment ordering  for B satisfying  1 – 5 there is a revision
operator ∗ from {B}×L into ℘ (L) satisfying ∗1 – ∗8 restricted to B such that
for all A ∈ L:
B ∗ A = Cn ({B ∈ L : ¬A ≺ B} ∪ {A}) .
For each revision operator ∗ from ℘ (L)×L into ℘ (L) satisfying ∗1 – ∗8 and
each set of sentences B ⊆ L there is an entrenchment ordering for B satisfying
1 –5 such that for all A ∈ L:
B ∗ A = Cn ({B ∈ L : ¬A ≺ B} ∪ {A}) .
This theorem states that the postulates for entrenchment orderings trans-
late into the postulates for revision functions, and conversely. Caie (this
volume, Section 2.3) states the analogous theorem regarding the relation-
ship between the postulates for entrenchment orderings and the postulates
for contraction functions.
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There is a different way of representing postulates ∗1 – ∗8 for revision
operators ∗ due to Grove (1988). Similar to Lewis’ (1973) theory of coun-
terfactuals it uses systems of spheres defined on a set of possible worlds
instead of entrenchment orderings defined on a formal language (for more
on counterfactuals see Briggs, this volume). A set of possible worlds can
be thought of as a set of complete, or maximally specific, descriptions of
the way the world could be. One approach, used by Grove (1988), is to
identify possible worlds with maximally consistent sets of sentences from
L, i.e. sets of sentences that are consistent, but that become inconsistent
as soon as a single new sentence is added. Another approach is to take
possible worlds as primitive. For present purposes we do not have to take
a stance on this issue and can assume that we are given a set of possible
worlds wL relative to which we interpret the sentences from L.
In order to state Grove’s (1988) approach it will be useful to have the
following notation. JAK = {ω ∈ wL : ω |= A} is the proposition expressed
by the sentence A from L, i.e. the set of possible worlds in which the sen-
tence A is true. JBK = {ω ∈ wL : ω |= A for all A ∈ B} is the proposition
expressed by the set of sentences B ⊆ L. In addition we need to assume
that our language L is sufficiently rich in expressive power so that for each
proposition p ⊆ wL there is a set of sentences from L, a “theory,” T
(
p
)
that expresses or means p, i.e. JT (p)K = p.
Let p ⊆ wL be a proposition and let s ⊆ ℘(wL) be a set of propositions.
The set s is a system of spheres in wL that is centered on p if, and only if, for
all propositions q, r ⊆ wL and all sentences A from L:
s1. If q, r ∈ s, then q ⊆ r or r ⊆ q. s is nested
s2. p ∈ s; and: if q ∈ s, then p ⊆ q. s is centered on p
s3. wL ∈ s.
s4. If JAK ∩ u 6= ∅ for some u ∈ s, then there is u∗ ∈ s such that:JAK∩ u∗ 6= ∅, and u∗ ⊆ v for all v ∈ s with JAK∩ v 6= ∅.
Requirement s1 says that systems of spheres are nested: any two spheres
are such that one is contained in the other, or they are the same sphere.
Requirement s2 says that the center of a system of spheres must itself be a
sphere in this system, and that every other sphere in the system contains
the center as a sub-sphere. Requirement s3 says that the set of all possible
worlds must be a sphere in every system of spheres. This implies that the
set of all possible worlds contains every other sphere in any given system
of spheres as a sub-sphere. Finally, in combination with s3 requirement
s4 says that for each logically consistent sentence A there is a smallest
sphere u∗ ∈ s that properly overlaps (has a non-empty intersection) with
the proposition expressed by A, JAK.
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Let cs (A) = JAK∩ u∗ and define cs (A) = ∅ if A is logically inconsistent.
Then cs (A) is the set of possible worlds in JAK that are “closest” to the
center p, where the meaning of ‘closeness’ is determined by the system of
spheres s. If A is logically consistent with (a set of sentences expressing)
the center p, then cs (A) is just the intersection of the center p with the set
of possible worlds JAK, JAK ∩ p. This is the easy case of expansion. The
difficult case of revision arises when A is not logically consistent with (a
set of sentences expressing) the center p. In this case the ideal doxastic
agent has to leave the center and move to the first sphere u∗ that properly
overlaps with the proposition expressed by A and adopt their intersection,JAK∩ u∗, as cs (A). Figure 1 represents this situation.
p
JAK
cs (A) = JAK∩ u∗
Figure 1: The possible worlds “closest” to the center p
If we have a belief set B ⊆ L we can use a system of spheres s in wL
that is centered on JBK ⊆ wL to define a revision operator ∗ restricted to
B as follows. For every sentence A from L:
B ∗ A = T (cs (A)) .
The idea is that what the ideal doxastic agent ends up believing after
revising ∗ her old belief set B with the new information A is (a set of
sentences expressing) the proposition cs (A) that contains the possible
worlds in JAK that are closest when the proposition expressed by her
old belief set, JBK, is the center. Expansion is the special case where the
proposition expressed by the new information properly overlaps with the
proposition expressed by the old belief set, JAK∩ JBK 6= ∅. In this special
case the ideal doxastic agent does not have to leave the old center JBK
of her doxastic state; it suffices if she narrows it down to the possible
worlds also contained in JAK. However, in the general case of revision this
intersection may be empty. In this general case the ideal doxastic agent
406 franz huber
may have to leave the innermost sphere JBK and move to the smallest
sphere u∗ that properly overlaps with JAK and adopt their intersection,
u∗ ∩ JAK, as the new center of her doxastic state.
As before we can picture the system of spheres centered on JBK as an
“onion” around JBK. The grey area JB ∗ AK = JT (cs (A))K = u∗ ∩ JAK is
the logically strongest proposition the ideal doxastic agent believes after
revising her old belief set B by the new information A; it is the new center
of her doxastic state (Figure 2).
JBK
JAK
JB ∗ AK
Figure 2: The strongest proposition believed after revising B by A
Grove (1988) proves the following theorem which states that an ideal
doxastic agent can be represented as revising her beliefs by relying on a
system of spheres satisfying s1 – s4 if, and only if, she can be represented as
revising her beliefs by employing a revision function satisfying postulates
∗1 – ∗8.
Theorem 2 Let L be a formal language, and let wL be a set of possible worlds
relative to which the sentences from L are interpreted and relative to which L
is sufficiently rich. For each set of sentences B ⊆ L and each system of spheres
s in wL that is centered on JBK and satisfies s1 – s4 there is a revision operator
∗ from {B} × L into ℘(L) satisfying ∗1 – ∗8 restricted to B such that for all
A ∈ L:
B ∗ A = T (cs (A)) .
For each revision operator ∗ from ℘(L)× L into ℘(L) satisfying ∗1 – ∗8 and
each set of sentences B ⊆ L there is a system of spheres s in wL that is centered
on JBK and satisfies s1 – s4 such that for all A ∈ L:
B ∗ A = T (cs (A)) .
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The two representations of belief revision in terms of systems of spheres
and in terms of belief revision functions are thus equivalent. Combined
with Theorem 1 this implies that the representation of belief revision in
terms of systems of spheres and in terms of entrenchment orderings are
also equivalent.
As an aside let me note that Grove’s (1988) notion of a system of spheres
is more general than Lewis’s (1973) notion in the following respect. Grove
(1988) allows s to be centered on arbitrary propositions p ⊆ wL, whereas
Lewis (1973, 14f) requires the center p to contain the actual world, and
nothing but the actual world. These last two requirements are known as
the principles of weak centering and of strong centering, respectively (see
Briggs, this volume). In another respect Grove’s (1988) notion is less general
than Lewis’s (1973). This is so, because requirement s4 makes a doxastic
version of the limit assumption, which Lewis (1973, 19f) famously rejects
and which Herzberger (1979) shows to be equivalent to the condition that
the set of counterfactual consequences {C ∈ L : A C} of any consistent
sentence A be consistent. Ranking theory also makes a doxastic version of
the limit assumption.
In the AGM theory of belief revision the ideal agent’s old doxastic state
is represented by her belief set B together with her entrenchment ordering
 for B. The latter ordering guides the revision process in that it specifies
which elements of the old belief set are given up, and which are kept,
when new information D is received. The result of revising the old belief
set by the new information D is a new belief set B ∗ D. Sophia’s old belief
set B includes the beliefs that it will rain on Tuesday, that it will be sunny
on Wednesday, and that weather forecasts are always right. Suppose her
belief A that it will be sunny on Wednesday is less entrenched than her
belief B that it will rain on Tuesday, which in turn is less entrenched than
her belief C that weather forecasts are always right, A ≺ B ≺ C.
On Monday Sophia comes to believe that the weather forecast for Tues-
day and Wednesday predicts rain, D. Consequently she has to give up her
belief A that it will be sunny on Wednesday or her belief C that weather
forecasts are always right. The reason is that it follows from D that at
least one of those two beliefs is false, i.e. {D} ` ¬A ∨ ¬C. This implies
that A ∧ C  ¬D. Since A is less entrenched than C, i.e. A ≺ C, A has to
go. Furthermore, since {C, D} 6` ¬B Sophia need not give up her belief
B that it will rain on Tuesday if she holds onto her belief C that weather
forecasts are always right, and adds the belief D that the weather forecast
for Tuesday and Wednesday predicts rain. In addition let us assume that
¬D ≺ B so that Sophia’s entrenchment ordering looks as follows: where
X ∼ Y is short for X  Y and Y  X,
⊥ ∼ ¬A ≺ A ∼ A ∧ C  ¬D ≺ B ≺ C ≺ A ∨ ¬A.
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Thus Sophia’s new belief set is
B ∗ D = Cn ({X : ¬D ≺ X} ∪ {D}) = Cn ({B, C, D,¬A}) .
To Sophia’s surprise it is sunny on Tuesday after all. Therefore Sophia
wants to revise her newly acquired belief set B ∗D a second time by ¬B to
correct her belief B that it will rain on Tuesday. In addition, Sophia has to
give up her belief D that the weather forecast for Tuesday and Wednesday
predicts rain (this might be because she has misheard the weather forecast)
or her belief C that weather forecasts are always right (this might be
because she has been too gullible). The reason is that it follows from
¬B that at least one of those two beliefs is false, i.e. {¬B} ` ¬D ∨ ¬C.
Unfortunately AGM belief revision theory is of no help here. While Sophia
could use her entrenchment ordering to revise her old belief set B to
a new belief set B ∗ D, the entrenchment ordering itself has not been
revised. Sophia’s new doxastic state is silent as to whether D is now more
entrenched than C (this might be because she was too gullible) or C is now
more entrenched than D (this might be because she misheard the weather
forecast) or C is now as entrenched as D (this might be because she was
too gullible and misheard the weather forecast). However, the latter is
exactly the kind of information that Sophia needs in order to revise her
beliefs a second time.
3 iterated belief revision
More generally, the problem is that Sophia’s doxastic state is represented
as a belief set plus an entrenchment ordering before the revision process,
but as a belief set without an entrenchment ordering after the revision
process. To handle iterated belief revisions the ideal agent’s doxastic state
has to be represented in the same way before and after the revision process.
Gärdenfors and Rott (1995, p. 37) call this the “principle of categorical
matching.”
Nayak (1994), Boutilier (1996), Darwiche and Pearl (1997), Segerberg
(1998), Fermé (2000), Rott (2003), Rott (2006), and others do exactly this
(see also Caie, this volume, Section 2.4). They augment the AGM postulates
by additional postulates specifying how the ideal doxastic agent should
revise her entrenchment ordering in addition to her belief set when she
receives new information. On their accounts the ideal agent’s doxastic
state is represented as a belief set plus an entrenchment ordering both
before and after the revision process, and both of these two elements are
revised when new information is received.
Let us have a closer look at the proposal by Darwiche and Pearl (1997)
(Caie, this volume, Section 2.4 also discusses Boutilier 1996’s proposal).
In addition to postulates ∗1 – ∗8 they propose four more postulates for
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iterated belief revision. The first of these, ∗9, says that revising an old
belief set by new information (say, a conjunction) should result in the same
new belief set as first revising the old belief set by a logical consequence of
the new information (say, one of the two conjuncts) and then revising the
resulting belief set by the new information in its entirety. That is, revision
by a more specific piece of information such as that Sophia had red wine
should override all changes that result from first revising the old belief set
by a less specific piece of information such as that Sophia had wine.
The second of these new postulates, ∗10, says that revising an old
belief set consecutively by two pieces of information that are logically
inconsistent should result in the same new belief set as revising the old
belief set by the second piece of information alone. That is, revision by
the second piece of information—say, that Sophia had red wine—should
override all changes that result from first revising the old belief by the first
piece of information that is logically incompatible with the second piece
of information—say, that Sophia had no wine.
Next suppose the ideal doxastic agent holds a belief after revising her
old belief set by a piece of information. This may, but need not be a new
belief, i.e. a belief not held previously. The third new postulate, ∗11, says
that the ideal doxastic agent should also hold this belief if she first revises
her old belief set by this very belief and then revises the resulting belief
set by said piece of information.
Finally, suppose there is a sentence that is logically compatible with
the result of revising the ideal doxastic agent’s old belief set by a piece of
information. The fourth new postulate, ∗12, says that this sentence should
also be logically compatible with what the ideal doxastic agent ends up
believing if she first revises her old belief set by this very sentence and
then revises the resulting belief set by said piece of information.
More precisely, Darwiche and Pearl (1997) require the following of all
sets of sentences B ⊆ L and all sentences A and B from L:
∗9. If {A} ` B, then (B ∗ B) ∗ A = B ∗ A.
∗10. If {A} ` ¬B, then (B ∗ B) ∗ A = B ∗ A.
∗11. If B ∈ B ∗ A, then B ∈ (B ∗ B) ∗ A.
∗12. If ¬B 6∈ B ∗ A, then ¬B 6∈ (B ∗ B) ∗ A.
In order to represent these four new postulates more perspicuously it will
be helpful to consider the following reformulation of a system of spheres
s in wL centered on some proposition p.
Let p ⊆ wL be a proposition and let ≤ be a binary relation on wL. The
relation ≤ is an implausibility ordering on wL with center p just in case the
following holds for all possible worlds ω, ω′, and ω′′ from wL and all
propositions q ⊆ wL:
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≤1. ω ≤ ω′ or ω′ ≤ ω. ≤ is connected
≤2. If ω ≤ ω′ and ω′ ≤ ω′′, then ω ≤ ω′′. ≤ is transitive
≤3. ω ∈ p if, and only if, for all ω∗ ∈ wL : ω ≤ ω∗.
≤4. If q 6= ∅, then {ω ∈ q : ω ≤ ω∗ for all ω∗ ∈ q} 6= ∅.
As suggested by its name, an implausibility ordering on wL with center
p orders the possible worlds from wL according to their implausibility.
Among other things, it is required that any two possible worlds can be
compared with respect to their implausibility: either the first possible
world is at least implausible as the second possible world, or the second
possible world is at least as implausible as the first possible world, or both.
It is also required that the ordering is transitive: if one possible world is at
least as implausible as a second possible world, and the second possible
world is at least as implausible as a third possible world, then the first
possible world is at least as implausible as the third possible world.
Furthermore it is required that the possible worlds in the center are
no more implausible than all possible worlds. That is, the center is the
proposition that contains all and only the least implausible possible worlds.
Finally it is required that each proposition that contains a possible world
also contains a possible world that is no more implausible than all possible
worlds in this proposition. The latter feature allows us to identify the
implausibility of a non-empty or logically consistent proposition with the
implausibility of the least implausible possible world(s) comprised by this
proposition.
A system of spheres centered on p can be understood as an implausi-
bility ordering with the center p containing the least implausible possible
worlds. In terms of such an implausibility ordering the problem with
the original AGM approach is the following. Before the revision process
the ideal agent’s doxastic state is represented as a belief set B plus an
implausibility ordering ≤B with center JBK. After revision by the new
information A the ideal agent’s doxastic state is represented as a belief
set B ∗ A, but without a corresponding implausibility ordering ≤B∗A. Gär-
denfors and Rott’s (1995) principal of categorical matching urges us to
represent the ideal agent’s doxastic state as a belief set plus an implausi-
bility ordering both before and after the revision process. In these terms
Darwiche and Pearl’s (1997) postulates ∗9 – ∗12 become the following
simple requirements.
First, the implausibility ordering among the possible worlds within the
proposition expressed by the new information should be the same before
and after a revision by the new information. Second, the implausibility
ordering among the possible worlds outside of the proposition expressed
by the new information should also be the same before and after a revision
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by the new information. Third, if a possible world within the proposition
expressed by the new information is less implausible than a possible world
outside of this proposition before revision by the new information, then
this should remain so after a revision by the new information. Fourth, if a
possible world within the proposition expressed by the new information
is at least as implausible as a possible world outside of this proposition
before revision by the new information, then this should also remain so
after a revision by the new information. That is, where ω < ω′ holds for
arbitrary possible worlds ω and ω′ from wL if, and only if, ω ≤ ω′ and
ω′ 6≤ ω, the following is required of all possible worlds ω and ω′ from wL
and all sentences A from L:
≤5. If ω,ω′ ∈ JAK, then: ω ≤B ω′ just in case ω ≤B∗A ω′.
≤6. If ω,ω′ 6∈ JAK, then: ω ≤B ω′ just in case ω ≤B∗A ω′.
≤7. If ω ∈ JAK and ω′ 6∈ JAK and if ω <B ω′, then ω <B∗A ω′.
≤8. If ω ∈ JAK and ω′ 6∈ JAK and ω ≤B ω′, then ω ≤B∗A ω′.
Before we turn to a representation theorem for iterated belief revision let
us consider a third representation theorem for belief revision. Theorem 1
and Theorem 2 tell us that the representation of belief revision in terms
of entrenchment orderings, in terms of belief revision functions, and in
terms of systems of spheres are all equivalent. According to the following
theorem due to Grove (1988) this equivalence extends to the representation
of belief revision in terms of implausibility orderings.
Theorem 3 Let L be a formal language, and let wL be a set of possible worlds
relative to which the sentences from L are interpreted and relative to which L
is sufficiently rich. For each set of sentences B ⊆ L and each implausibility
ordering ≤ on wL with center JBK that satisfies ≤ 1 –≤ 4 there is a revision
operator ∗ from {B} × L into ℘(L) satisfying ∗1 – ∗8 restricted to B such that
for all A ∈ L:
B ∗ A = T
({
ω ∈ JAK : ω ≤ ω∗ for all ω∗ ∈ JAK}) .
For each revision operator ∗ from ℘(L) × L into ℘(L) that satisfies ∗1 – ∗8
and each set of sentences B ⊆ L there is an implausibility ordering ≤ on wL
with center JBK satisfying ≤1 –≤4 such that for all A ∈ L:
B ∗ A = T
({
ω ∈ JAK : ω ≤ ω∗ for all ω∗ ∈ JAK}) .
The complicated looking proposition {ω ∈ JAK : ω ≤ ω∗ for all ω∗ ∈ JAK}
is simply the set of the least implausible possible worlds in which the new
information A is true. This means that the belief set B ∗ A that results from
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revising ∗ the ideal doxastic agent’s old belief set B by new information
A expresses the proposition that is comprised by the least implausible
A-worlds.
Against this background we can now state the following representation
theorem for iterated belief revision due to Darwiche and Pearl (1997).
According to it the representation of iterated belief revision in terms
of belief revision functions à la postulates ∗9 – ∗12 is equivalent to the
simple representation of iterated belief revision in terms of implausibility
orderings à la ≤5 –≤8.
Theorem 4 Let L and wL be as in Theorem 3. Suppose ∗ is a revision operator
from ℘(L)×L into ℘(L) that satisfies ∗1 – ∗8. According to Theorem 3, there
exists a family of implausibility orderings (≤B)B⊆L on wL such that for each
set of sentences B ⊆ L: ≤B satisfies ≤1 –≤4 and is such that, for all sentences
A ∈ L, B ∗ A = T
({
ω ∈ JAK : ω ≤B ω∗ for all ω∗ ∈ JAK}). For this ∗ and
any one of these families (≤B)B⊆L: ∗ satisfies ∗9 – ∗12 if, and only if, for every
set of sentences B ⊆ L, ≤B satisfies ≤5 –≤8.
The approaches to iterated belief revision mentioned above all have in
common that the ideal agent’s doxastic state is represented as a belief set
plus an entrenchment ordering/system of spheres/implausibility ordering
both before and after the revision process. Furthermore these approaches
have in common that the new information is represented as a single
sentence (or a single proposition). The latter is also true for the approach
by Jin and Thielscher (2007) discussed below, but not for what Rott (2009)
calls “two-dimensional” belief revision operators (see also Cantwell 1997;
Fermé and Rott 2004; Rott 2007).
In one-dimensional belief revision, as we may call it, the new informa-
tion comes as a “naked” (Rott, 2007) sentence or proposition. It is the job
of the various belief revision methods, as opposed to the new informa-
tion itself, to say exactly where in the new entrenchment ordering/sys-
tem of spheres/implausibility ordering the new sentence or proposition
should be placed. These belief revision methods include lexicographic re-
vision (Nayak, 1994), natural revision (Boutilier, 1996), irrevocable revision
(Segerberg, 1998; Fermé, 2000), irrefutable revision (Rott, 2006), and still
others. In two-dimensional belief revision it is the new information itself
that carries at least part of this information. Here the new information does
not say that the input sentence A is true (so should be accepted according
to the Success postulate). Instead it specifies, at least to some extent, how
firmly A is accepted or believed by specifying that, in the new entrenchment
ordering ∗, A is at least as entrenched as some “reference sentence” B.
Thus the new information is now of the form: A ∗ B. (For the purposes
of this entry we may ignore “non-prioritized” belief revision, where the
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new information need not be accepted. See Hansson, Fermé, Cantwell,
and Falappa, 2001.)
Let us return to our example. On Monday Sophia comes to believe
that the weather forecast for Tuesday and Wednesday predicts rain, D.
In one-dimensional belief revision she picks one of the iterated belief
revision methods mentioned above. Then she revises her old belief set
B and entrenchment ordering B to obtain a new belief set B ∗ D and
a new entrenchment ordering B∗D. Different methods return different
outputs, but on all of them Sophia ends up believing that it will rain on
Tuesday, B. On Tuesday Sophia sees that it is sunny and so receives the
new information that it does not rain after all, ¬B. In one-dimensional
belief revision Sophia proceeds as before.
In two-dimensional belief revision Sophia does not receive the quali-
tative information ¬B about Tuesday’s weather. Instead she receives the
comparative information C ∗ ¬B about her new doxastic state. This piece
of new information says that, in her new entrenchment ordering ∗, the
claim that it does not rain on Tuesday is at least as entrenched as the claim
that weather forecasts are always right, indicating that she trusts her sight
at least as much as the weatherperson (we could take a reference sentence
other than C).
Now, there still are several belief revision methods to choose from (see
Rott 2009). Among others, this reflects the fact that Sophia can respect the
constraint C ∗ ¬B by lowering the doxastic status of C, or by raising the
doxastic status of ¬B. However, the new information now is more specific
and leaves less room to be filled by the revision method. It is then only a
small, but crucial step to equip Sophia with the quantitative, numerical
information that ¬B is entrenched to a specific degree. In this case the
new information completely determines exactly where ¬B is located in the
new entrenchment ordering on its own, without the help of the revision
method. The latter merely has to incorporate this new information into
Sophia’s old doxastic state in a consistent way. Ranking theory does exactly
this.
Before presenting ranking theory let us return to the qualitative ap-
proaches to iterated belief revision. Postulates ∗1 – ∗12 are still compatible
with many conflicting belief revision methods. Jin and Thielscher (2007)
attempt to remedy this situation by additionally requiring the ideal doxas-
tic agent to consider the new information B to be independent of a sentence
A after revision by B if she considered B to be independent of A before
revision by B. In other words, revision should preserve independencies.
While the idea behind Jin and Thielscher (2007)’s proposal seems to be
correct, their actual requirement turns out to be too strong. The reason is
that their notion of dependence is too strong in the sense that too many
sentences are rendered independent of other sentences.
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According to Jin and Thielscher (2007) a believed sentence A is inde-
pendent of another sentence B if the believed sentence A is still believed
after revision by the negation of the other sentence, ¬B. However, I can
receive new information ¬B—say, that the captain of my favorite soccer
team will not be fit for the match—whose negation ¬¬B is positively
relevant to, and so not independent of, a belief of mine A—say, that my
favorite soccer team will win the match—without making me give up
this belief of mine altogether. More generally, the ways two sentences
can depend on each other are many and varied, and the qualitative and
comparative notions of AGM belief revision theory and its refinements
seem to be too coarse-grained to capture these dependencies. Hild and
Spohn (2008) argue axiomatically, and we will see in the next section, that,
in order to adequately represent all dependencies, and to handle iterated
belief revisions, one has to go all the way from qualitative belief sets and
comparative entrenchment orderings/systems of spheres/implausibility
orderings to quantitative, numerical ranking functions.
4 ranking theory
Ranking functions are introduced by Spohn (1988, 1990) to represent
qualitative conditional belief. A comprehensive overview can be found
in Spohn (2012). The theory is quantitative or numerical in the sense
that ranking functions assign numbers, so-called ranks, to sentences or
propositions. These numbers are needed for the definition of conditional
ranking functions which represent conditional beliefs. As we will see, once
conditional ranking functions are defined we can interpret everything
in purely qualitative, albeit conditional terms. The numbers assigned by
conditional ranking functions are called conditional ranks. They are defined
as differences of non-conditional ranks.
Instead of taking the objects of belief to be sentences of a formal language
it is both more general and more convenient to take them to be propositions
of some field or algebra over a set of possible worlds W. Here is the relevant
definition. A set of subsets of W, A ⊆ ℘(W), is an algebra over W if, and
only if,
(i) the empty or contradictory set ∅ is a proposition in A,
(ii) if A is a proposition in A, then the complement or negation of A,
W \ A = A, is also a proposition in A, and
(iii) if both A and B are propositions in A, then the union or disjunction
of A and B, A ∪ B, is also a proposition in A.
An algebra A over W is a σ-algebra if, and only if, the following holds
for every countable set B ⊆ ℘(W): if all the members or elements of
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B are propositions in A, i.e. if B ⊆ A, then the union or disjunction of
the elements of B, ⋃B, is also a proposition in A. Finally, an algebra A
over W is complete if, and only if, the following holds for every (countable
or uncountable) set B ⊆ ℘(W): if all the members or elements of B are
propositions in A, i.e. if B ⊆ A, then the union or disjunction of the
elements of B, ⋃B, is also a proposition in A. The power-set of a set of
possible worlds W, ℘(W), is a complete algebra over W.
A function $ : A → N ∪ {∞} from an algebra of propositions A over
a non-empty set of possible worlds W into the set of natural numbers N
extended by infinity ∞, N ∪ {∞}, is a ranking function on A just in case
for all propositions A and B from A:
$ (W) = 0, (1)
$ (∅) = ∞, (2)
$ (A ∪ B) = min {$ (A) , $ (B)} . (3)
As in probability theory, if A is a σ-algebra, axiom (3) can be strengthened
to countable unions. The resulting ranking function is called “countably
minimitive.” In contrast to probability theory, if A is a complete algebra,
axiom (3) can even be strengthened to arbitrary unions. The resulting
ranking function is called “completely minimitive.”
For a non-empty or consistent proposition A 6= ∅ fromA the conditional
ranking function $
(· | A) : A \ {∅} → N ∪ {∞} based on the (non-
conditional) ranking function $ (·) : A →N∪ {∞} is defined as
$
(· | A) =
 $ (· ∩ A)− $ (A) , if $ (A) < ∞,∞ or 0, if $ (A) = ∞.
For the case where $ (A) = ∞ Goldszmidt and Pearl (1996, p. 63) suggest
∞ as the value for $
(
B | A) for all propositions B from A. For this case
Huber (2006, p. 464) suggests 0 as the value for $
(
B | A) for all non-
empty or consistent propositions B from A and additionally stipulates
$
(
∅ | A) = ∞ to ensure that every conditional ranking function on A is a
ranking function on A.
A ranking function $ is regular if, and only if,
$ (A) < $ (∅) = ∞,
for all non-empty or consistent propositions A from A. In contrast to
probability theory it is always possible to define a regular ranking function,
no matter how rich or fine-grained the underlying algebra of propositions
(see Hájek, manuscript).
Ranks are interpreted doxastically as grades of disbelief. A proposition
A is disbelieved just in case A is assigned a positive rank, $ (A) > 0. A
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proposition that is not disbelieved is assigned rank 0, but this does not
mean that it is believed. Instead, belief in a proposition is characterized
as disbelief in its negation: a proposition A is believed just in case the
negation of A, A, is disbelieved, $
(
A
)
> 0. An agent suspends judgment
with respect to a proposition (and its negation) if, and only if, both the
proposition and its negation are assigned rank 0.
A proposition A is disbelieved conditional on a proposition C just in
case A is assigned a positive rank conditional on C, $
(
A | C) > 0. A
proposition A is believed conditional on a proposition C just in case
the negation of A, A, is disbelieved conditional on C, $
(
A | C
)
> 0. It
takes getting used to read positive numbers in this “negative” way, but
mathematically this is the simplest way to axiomatize ranking functions.
Note that it follows from Huber’s (2006) definition of a conditional
ranking function that the ideal doxastic agent should not disbelieve a
proposition A conditional on itself, $
(
A | A) = 0, if, and only if, A is
non-empty or consistent.
In doxastic terms the first axiom says that the ideal doxastic agent
should not disbelieve the tautological proposition W. The second axiom
says that she should disbelieve the empty or contradictory proposition ∅
with maximal strength ∞. Given the definition of conditional ranks, the
second axiom can also be read in purely qualitative, albeit conditional
terms: in these terms it says that the ideal doxastic agent should disbelieve
the empty or contradictory proposition conditional on any non-empty
or consistent proposition. It follows that the ideal doxastic agent should
believe the tautological proposition with maximal strength, or conditional
on any non-empty or consistent proposition.
Part of what the third axiom says is that the ideal doxastic agent should
disbelieve a disjunction A ∪ B just in case she disbelieves both its disjuncts
A and B. Given the definition of conditional ranks, the third axiom ex-
tends this requirement to conditional beliefs. As noted above, the ideal
doxastic agent should not disbelieve a non-empty or consistent proposi-
tion conditional on itself. Given this consequence of the definition of a
conditional ranking function, the third axiom says—in purely qualitative,
albeit conditional terms—the following. For all non-empty or consistent
propositions C, the ideal doxastic agent should disbelieve a disjunction
A ∪ B conditional on C just in case she disbelieves A conditional on C and
she disbelieves B conditional on C. Countably and completely minimi-
tive ranking functions extend this “conditional consistency” requirement
to countable and arbitrary unions, respectively. For any non-empty or
consistent proposition C, the ideal doxastic agent should disbelieve
⋃B
conditional on C just in case she disbelieves each disjunct B from B condi-
tional on C. We thus see that all that axioms (1)–(3) of ranking theory ask
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of the ideal doxastic agent is that her beliefs be consistent, and that her
conditional beliefs be conditionally consistent.
Ranks are numerical, but unlike probabilities, which are measured
on an absolute scale, ranks do not utilize all the information carried by
these numbers. Instead, ranks are at best measured on a ratio scale (Hild
& Spohn, 2008)—at best, because even the choice of 0 as threshold for
disbelief is somewhat arbitrary, as Spohn (2015, p. 9) notes (but see Raidl,
2018, for subtle differences for conditional belief). Some positive, but finite
natural number would do just as well. This is perhaps most perspicuous
by considering what Spohn (2012) calls the two-sided ranking function
β : A → Z∪ {∞} ∪ {−∞} whose range is the set of integers Z extended
by plus infinity ∞ and minus infinity −∞, Z∪ {∞} ∪ {−∞}. β is defined
in terms of $ as follows: for all propositions A in A, β (A) = $
(
A
)
− $ (A).
Ranking functions and two-sided ranking functions are interdefinable. The
latter are more difficult to axiomatize, but they may be more intuitive,
because they characterize belief in positive terms as follows.
A proposition A is believed if, and only if, its two-sided rank is positive,
β (A) > 0. A proposition A is believed conditional on a proposition C
if, and only if, its two-sided conditional rank is positive, β
(
A | C) > 0.
Interestingly, any other finite threshold equally gives rise to a notion of
belief (that is consistent and deductively closed as explained below): a
proposition is believed if, and only if, its rank is greater than some finite,
non-negative threshold n, β (A) > n. Hence ranking theory validates
the Lockean thesis (Foley, 2009; Hawthorne, 2009). Furthermore, while
it may appear unfair to reserve infinitely many numbers for belief and
for disbelief, and only the number 0 for suspension of judgment, we now
see that this is not essential to the theory and can be fixed by adopting
a threshold other than 0 (there are still only finitely many levels for
suspension of judgment, though).
Doxastically interpreted, axioms (1)–(3) are synchronic norms for how
an ideal doxastic agent should organize her beliefs and conditional beliefs
at a given moment in time. These axioms are supplemented by diachronic
norms for how she should update her beliefs and conditional beliefs over
time if new information of various formats is received. The first update
rule is defined for the case where the new information comes in the form
a certainty. It mirrors the update rule of strict conditionalization from
probability theory (Vineberg, 2000).
Update Rule 1 (Plain Conditionalization, Spohn 1988) If $ (·) : A →
N ∪ {∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t
and the later time t′ her ranks for E and E from A are directly affected and she
becomes certain of E, but no logically stronger proposition (i.e. her rank for E at
t is finite, and E is the logically strongest proposition for whose negation E her
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rank at t′ is ∞), and her ranks are not directly affected in any other way such as
forgetting etc., then her ranking function at t′ should be $E (·) = $
(· | E).
Plain conditionalization asks the ideal doxastic agent to revise her beliefs
and conditional beliefs by holding onto those conditional beliefs whose
condition is the most specific, i.e. logically strongest, proposition she be-
came certain of, subject to the constraint that the beliefs and conditional
beliefs in the resulting new belief set are consistent and conditionally con-
sistent, respectively. In slightly different terminology we can say that plain
conditionalization has the ideal agent revise her doxastic state by hold-
ing onto those inferential beliefs whose premise is the logically strongest
proposition she became certain of as a result of some experiential event
that is not under her doxastic control.
The second update rule is defined for the case where the new infor-
mation comes in the form of new ranks for the elements of a partition.
It mirrors the update rule of Jeffrey conditionalization from probability
theory (Jeffrey, 1983).
Update Rule 2 (Spohn Conditionalization, Spohn 1988) If $ (·) : A →
N ∪ {∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between
t and the later time t′ her ranks on the experiential partition {Ei ∈ A : i ∈ I}
are directly affected and change to ni ∈ N ∪ {∞} with min {ni : i ∈ I} = 0,
and ni = ∞ if $ (Ei) = ∞, and her ranks are not directly affected on any finer
partition or in any other way such as forgetting etc., then her ranking function
at t′ should be $Ei→ni (·),
$Ei→ni (·) = min i∈I
{
$
(· | Ei)+ ni} .
Spohn conditionalization asks the ideal doxastic agent to revise her beliefs
and conditional beliefs by holding onto those conditional beliefs whose
conditions are the most specific propositions whose doxastic standing
has changed as a result of some experiential event that is not under her
doxastic control, subject to the constraint that the beliefs and conditional
beliefs in the resulting new belief set are consistent and conditionally
consistent, respectively. The restriction to hold fixed only those conditional
beliefs whose conditions are the most specific propositions whose doxastic
standing has been directly affected is important.
Suppose you hold the conditional beliefs that Sophia will have white
wine tonight if there is wine left, and that she will have red wine tonight
if there is red wine left, but no white wine—say, because you believe that
Sophia prefers having white wine to having red wine to having no wine.
Suppose further you subsequently come to believe, as a result of being
told so by a source you deem reliable, that there is red wine left, but no
white wine. Since your beliefs are deductively closed you also come to
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believe that there is wine left. In this case you should not hold onto your
conditional belief that Sophia will have white wine tonight if there is wine
left. Instead, you should only hold onto your conditional belief that Sophia
will have red wine tonight if there is red wine left, but no white wine. The
same is true if you subsequently do not merely come to believe, but become
certain in this way that there is red wine left, but no white wine. This
is the reason for the restriction in plain conditionalization to hold fixed
only those conditional beliefs whose condition is the logically strongest
proposition the ideal doxastic agent becomes certain of. Furthermore,
this illustrates that plain conditionalization is the special case of Spohn
conditionalization where the experiential partition is
{
E, E
}
and where
the new ranks are 0 and ∞, respectively.
The third update rule is defined for the case where the new information
reports the differences between the old and the new ranks for the elements
of a partition. It mirrors the update rule of Field conditionalization from
probability theory (Field, 1978) and is developed further in Bewersdorf
(2013) .
Update Rule 3 (Shenoy Conditionalization, Shenoy 1991) If $ (·) : A →
N ∪ {∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between
t and the later time t′ her ranks on the experiential partition {Ei ∈ A : i ∈ I}
are directly affected and change by zi ∈N, where min {zi : i ∈ I} = 0, and her
ranks are not directly affected on any finer partition or in any other way such as
forgetting etc., then her ranking function at t′ should be $Ei↑zi (·),
$Ei↑zi (·) = min i∈I
{
$ (· ∩ Ei) + zi −m
}
,
where m = min i∈I
{
zi + $ (Ei)
}
.
Spohn conditionalizing E and E to 0 and n, respectively, keeps the relative
positions of all possible worlds in E and all possible worlds in E fixed.
It improves the rank of E to 0 and changes the rank of E to n. Shenoy
conditionalizing E and E by 0 and n, respectively, improves the possibilities
within E by n, as compared to the possibilities in E. The value m is a
normalization parameter ensuring that at least one possible world is
assigned rank zero so that the result is a ranking function.
Spohn and Shenoy conditionalization can be defined in terms of each
other. Their difference lies in the interpretation of the input parameters.
Spohn conditionalization is result-oriented in the sense that the numbers
ni characterize the result of the experiential event on the agent’s ranks
for the propositions Ei. The latter depend in part on the agent’s initial
ranks, which is why the numbers ni do not characterize the impact of the
experiential event as such, independently of the agent’s initial beliefs. In
contrast to this the numbers zi in Shenoy conditionalization do characterize
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the impact of the experiential event as such, independently of the agent’s
initial beliefs. They do so in the sense that the rank of Ei is deteriorated by
zi relative to the rank of the “best” cell. Note that, when there are more
than two cells, the latter need not be the cell with the lowest initial rank.
In the case of both Spohn and Shenoy conditionalization the new infor-
mation consists of a (partition of) proposition(s) together with a (list of)
number(s). This reflects the fact that the quality of new information varies
with how reliable or trustworthy the agent deems its source: it makes
a difference if the weatherperson who Sophia does not know predicts
that it will rain, if a friend Sophia trusts tells her so, or if Sophia sees
for herself that it is raining. In each case the proposition Sophia comes
to believe is that it is raining, but the effect of the new information on
her old beliefs will be a different one in each case. The difference in how
reliable or trustworthy Sophia deems the sources of the new information
is reflected in the numbers accompanying this proposition.
All that axioms (1)–(3) ask of the ideal doxastic agent is that her beliefs be
consistent, and that her conditional beliefs be conditionally consistent. We
will see below that all that update rules (1)–(3) ask of her is that her beliefs
remain consistent, and that her conditional beliefs remain conditionally
consistent.
Sophia’s ranking function r will assign a positive rank to the propositionJAK that it will not be sunny on Wednesday. Her ranking function r will
assign a greater rank to the proposition JBK that it will not rain on Tuesday.
Her ranking function r will assign an even greater rank to the propositionJCK that weather forecasts are not always right so that
0 < r
(JAK) < r (JBK) < r (JCK) .
More generally, for regular ranking functions r, the ordering A r B on L
just in case
r
(JAK) ≤ r (JBK)
is an entrenchment ordering for
B =
{
C ∈ L : r
(JCK) > 0} .
In what follows I will assume that r is regular.
In other words, the set of propositions
sr =
{
r−1 (n) ⊆W : n ∈N
}
is a system of spheres in W centered on r−1 (0), where
r−1 (n) =
{
ω ∈W : r ({ω}) = n}
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is the set of possible worlds that are assigned rank n. In still other words,
the ordering ω ≤r ω′ on W just in case r
({ω}) ≤ r ({ω′}) is an implausi-
bility ordering on W with the center being the conjunction or intersection
of all beliefs,
⋂{JCK ⊆W : r (JCK) > 0} = {ω ∈W : r ({ω}) = 0} .
(I make the simplifying assumption that the algebra of propositions A
is the power set of W. If this assumption is not made, these definitions
are slightly more complicated.) Therefore ranking theory satisfies the
postulates of AGM belief revision theory. It also satisfies the four additional
postulates ∗9 – ∗12 for iterated belief revision proposed by Darwiche and
Pearl (1997). This can easily be verified by checking that the four postulates
≤5 –≤8 hold for ≤r (see also Spohn 2012, chapter 5.6). In what follows I
will suppress ‘JK’ and denote propositions by capital letters.
When Sophia comes to believe on Monday that the weather forecast for
Tuesday and Wednesday predicts rain, she has to tell us how strongly she
now disbelieves the proposition D that the weather forecast for Tuesday
and Wednesday does not predict rain in order for Spohn conditionalization
to tell her how to revise her beliefs. As an approximation it suffices if she
tells us how many information sources saying D it would now take for her
to give up her disbelief D, as compared to how many information sources
saying X it would then have taken for her to give up her disbelief that X
for X = A, B, C, D, A, B, C, D. Suppose Sophia’s old ranks are r(A) = 1,
r(D) = 2, r(B) = 5, and r(C) = 7, and her new rank is r∗(D) = 13.
According to Spohn conditionalization Sophia’s new ranks are:
r∗ (X) = min
{
r
(
X | D)+ 0, r (X | D)+ 13} .
In order to calculate Sophia’s new ranks r∗(X) we thus need her old
conditional ranks r(X | D) and r(X | D) as well as her new ranks for the
conditions D and D. This in turn requires us to determine her old ranks
for various conjunctions. Suppose the numbers are as in Figure 3. Then
Sophia’s new ranks are r∗(C) = 6, r∗(B) = 7, r∗(A) = 7, r∗(D) = 13.
Note that C is a proposition Sophia believes both before and after
revision by D, r(C) > 0 and r∗(C) > 0, although D is positively relevant to,
and so not independent of, C in the sense that r(C | D) = 7 > 6 = r(C | D).
In other words, Sophia receives new information D whose negation is
positively relevant to, and so not independent of, her belief that C without
making her give up her belief that C. On the other hand, if Sophia considers
D independent of a proposition X before revision by D, then she also does
so after revision by D. More generally, suppose two propositions A and
B are independent according to a ranking function r, r(A | B) = r(A | B)
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∞
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C
C
D
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∞
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D
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C
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D
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Figure 3: Sophia’s old and new ranks for various conjunctions
and r(A | B) = r(A | B). In this case A and B are independent according to
any ranking function r∗ that results from r by what we may call a “Spohn
shift” on the partition {B, B}, i.e. the result of Spohn conditionalization on
this partition for an arbitrary pair of natural numbers.
This feature, which is known as rigidity, vindicates the idea behind Jin
and Thielscher (2007)’s proposal that revision should preserve indepen-
dencies. It does so by fixing their notion of independence. For more on the
definition of rank-theoretic independence see Spohn (1999). As an aside
let me note that, while rigidity is generally considered to be a desirable
feature of an update rule, Weisberg (2009, 2015) uses rigidity to argue
that neither Bayesianism nor Dempster-Shafer theory (Haenni, 2009) nor
ranking theory can handle a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining.
Huber (2014a) defends these theories against Weisberg’s charge.
Spohn conditionalization gives Sophia a complete new ranking function
r∗ that she can use to revise her newly acquired belief set
B∗ =
{
X ∈ A : r∗
(
X
)
> 0
}
a second time when she learns on Tuesday that it is sunny after all. All she
has to do is tell us how strongly she then disbelieves the proposition B that
it will rain on Tuesday. If r∗∗ (B) = 13, her newer ranks are r∗∗(A) = 1,
r∗∗(C) = 11, r∗∗(D) = 11. See Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Sophia’s new and newer ranks for various conjunctions
This means that Sophia did not mishear the weather forecast, but was
too gullible (or so we assume for purposes of illustration), and so has to
give up her belief C that weather forecasts are always right. In addition
she also has to regain her belief A that it will be sunny on Wednesday.
At the end of this section Sophia’s doxastic career is pictured as a
sequence of “onions.” The difference to the AGM theory is that, in ranking
theory, the layers carry numbers which reflect how far apart they are from
each other according to the ideal agent’s doxastic state. A different way to
picture the situation is to allow for empty layers and to have one, possibly
empty, layer for each natural number.
We see that ranking theory handles indefinitely iterated belief revisions.
It does so in contrast to the AGM theory of belief revision. However, it
does so also in contrast to probability theory. As yet another aside, let
me briefly explain why. In probability theory the ideal doxastic agent is
sometimes forced to assign probability 0 to some non-empty or consistent
proposition. In order to enable her to learn such propositions the ideal
doxastic agent is usually represented by a Popper-Rényi measure which
is more general than a classical probability (Popper, 1955; Rényi, 1955;
Stalnaker, 1970; Spohn, 1986; Easwaran, this volume). However, as already
noted by Harper (1976), Popper-Rényi measures violate the principal of
categorical matching and so cannot handle iterated revisions of degrees of
belief: the result of conditionalizing a Popper-Rényi measure is not another
Popper-Rényi measure, but a classical probability; and as Boutilier (1995)
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notes, there is no straightforward analogue of Jeffrey conditionalization
for Popper-Rényi measures. Spohn (2006b) provides an even more general
notion of probability, ranked probability, which results from making prob-
abilities the objects of rank-theoretic belief. It handles iterated revisions
of probabilistic degrees of belief and satisfies the principal of categorical
matching: the result of conditionalizing a ranked probability is another
ranked probability.
Ranking theory is a normative theory that addresses the question how
an ideal doxastic agent should organize her beliefs and conditional beliefs
at a given moment in time, and how she should revise these beliefs across
time if she receives new information of various formats. Why should
an ideal doxastic agent obey the norms of ranking theory? That is, why
should an ideal doxastic agent organize her beliefs and conditional beliefs
at a given moment in time according to axioms (1)–(3)? And why should
she update her beliefs and conditional beliefs across time according to
update rules (1)–(3) if she receives new information of the appropriate
format? Who are we, Sophia asks, to tell her what—or rather: how—to
believe? To answer these questions, and to respond to Sophia, we need a
bit of terminology.
An ideal doxastic agent’s grade of entrenchment for a proposition A
is defined as the smallest number n such that she would give up her
disbelief in A if she received the information A from n sources she deemed
independent and minimally positively reliable, mp-reliable, about A, and
this was all that directly affected her doxastic state. If the ideal doxastic
agent does not disbelieve A to begin with, her grade of entrenchment for
A is 0. Her grade of entrenchment for A is higher, the more information
sources of the sort described it would take for her to give up her disbelief
in A.
As mentioned previously, whereas probabilities are measured on an
absolute scale, ranks are at best measured on a ratio scale. The same
is true for grades of entrenchment. Therefore we need to fix a unit for
these grades of entrenchment. We need to do the same when we want to
report the amount of money in your bank account, which is measured on
a ratio scale, or the temperature in Vienna on January 1, 2018, which is
measured on an interval scale. To say that the amount of money in your
bank account, or the temperature in Vienna on January 1, 2018, equals
17 is not saying anything if we do not also specify a unit such as Euros
or degrees of Celsius. Information sources that are deemed mp-reliable
are used to define the unit in which grades of entrenchment are reported.
Furthermore, to guarantee that these units can be added and compared,
just as we can add and compare sums of Euros and degrees of Celsius, we
need to make sure that these information sources are not only deemed
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to be mp-reliable by the ideal doxastic agent, but also independent in the
relevant sense.
We non-ideal doxastic agents generally do not deem our sources of
information independent or mp-reliable. One expert’s saying A will some-
times make us stop disbelieving A immediately, while the sermons of a
dozen others won’t. And the last-born’s telling a parent that there is no red
wine left after the first-born has already confessed to drinking it up won’t
make much of a difference to the parent’s grade of disbelief that there is
red wine left. However, this is no argument against the usefulness of this
notion. Information sources that are deemed independent and mp-reliable
are a theoretical construct that are assumed or postulated to exist. They
are the smallest units such that the reliability one deems any possible
information source to possess can be expressed as a multiple of them.
Let $ be the ideal doxastic agent’s entrenchment function, i.e. the func-
tion that summarizes her grades of entrenchment for all propositions from
A. Her belief set B$ is the set of propositions with a positive grade of
entrenchment,
B$ =
{
A ∈ A : $
(
A
)
> 0
}
.
Her belief set conditional on the consistent proposition C is the set of
propositions with a positive grade of entrenchment conditional on C,
B$(·|C) =
{
A ∈ A : $
(
A | C
)
> 0
}
.
B ⊆ A is consistent in the finite / countable / complete sense if, and only if, for
every finite/countable/arbitrary B− ⊆ B, ⋂B− 6= ∅. It is deductively closed
in the finite / countable / complete sense if, and only if, for every finite/count-
able/arbitrary B− ⊆ B and all A ∈ A: if ⋂B− ⊆ A, then A ∈ B. Similarly,
for a proposition C from A, B ⊆ A is conditionally consistent given C in the
finite / countable / complete sense if, and only if, for every finite/countable/ar-
bitrary B− ⊆ B: C ∩⋂B− 6= ∅. It is conditionally deductively closed given C
in the finite / countable / complete sense if, and only if, for every finite/count-
able/arbitrary B− ⊆ B and all A ∈ A: if C ∩⋂B− ⊆ A, then A ∈ B.
Now we can respond to Sophia as well as answer the question why an
ideal doxastic agent should organize her beliefs and conditional beliefs at
a given moment in time according to axioms (1)–(3), and why she should
update her beliefs and conditional beliefs across time according to update
rules (1)–(3) if she receives new information of the appropriate format. She
should do so, because
Theorem 5 An ideal doxastic agent’s belief set B$ and conditional belief sets
B$(·|C) for consistent conditions C are (conditionally) consistent and deductively
closed in the finite / countable / complete sense (given C)—and would remain so
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in response to any finite sequence of experiences—if, and only if, $ is a finitely
/ countably / completely minimitive ranking function that would be revised ac-
cording to update rules (1)–(3).
This theorem from Huber (2007) rests on several unstated assumptions
which are spelled out in Huber (manuscript).
The argument based on this theorem is supposed to establish the thesis
that an ideal doxastic agent’s beliefs and conditional beliefs should obey
the synchronic and diachronic rules of ranking theory. It provides a means-
end justification for this thesis in the spirit of epistemic consequentialism
(Percival, 2002; Stalnaker, 2002). The idea is that obeying the normative
constraints of ranking theory is a (necessary and sufficient) means to
attaining the end of being “eternally consistent and deductively closed.”
The latter end in turn is a (necessary, but insufficient) means to attaining
the end of always having only true beliefs, and, subject to the constraint
that all of them are true, as many thereof as possible. To the extent that the
ideal doxastic agent has this end, she should obey the norms of ranking
theory. It is not that we are telling Sophia what and how to believe. She
is the one who is assumed to have these ends. We merely point out the
obtaining means-end relationship. Of course, if Sophia does not desire
to always hold only true beliefs, and, subject to the constraint that all of
them are true, as many thereof as possible, our response will cut no ice.
But that is beside the point: it is mistaking a hypothetical imperative for a
categorical imperative.
Brössel, Eder, and Huber (2013) discuss the implications of this result
as well as its Bayesian role-model, Joyce’s (1998, 2009) “non-pragmatic
vindication of probabilism” (see also Pettigrew 2011, 2013), for considering
doxastic rationality a form of instrumental rationality, and for means-end
epistemology in general. Alternatively one may use the representation
result by Hild and Spohn (2008), or the rank-theoretic decision theory by
Giang and Shenoy (2000), to obtain a justification of ranking theory that
is deontological in spirit. For instance, the former result can be used to
argue that all and only ranking functions obey the duties, or categorical
imperatives, of iterated belief contraction, where these duties, or categorical
imperatives, take the form of axioms for iterated contractions of beliefs.
Figure 5 depicts Sophia’s ranking functions r and r∗ as “numbered
onions.” Alternatively (Figure 6) Sophia’s ranking function r can be pic-
tured as an onion with one, possibly empty, layer r−1 (n) for each natural
number n. Sophia’s old rank for D is 2, i.e. r(D) = 2, and her old rank for
D is 0, i.e. r(D) = 0. Sophia’s new ranking function r∗ results from her old
ranking function r by first improving the possible worlds in which D is
true by 2 ranks so that the new rank of D is 0, i.e. r∗ (D) = 0. In a second
step the possible worlds in which D is true are deteriorated by 13 ranks so
that the new rank of D is 13, i.e. r∗(D) = 13. The relative positions of the
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Figure 5: Sophia’s ranking functions depicted as “numbered onions”
possible worlds in which D is true, and the possible worlds in which D is
true, are expressed in the conditional ranking functions r(· | D) = r∗(· | D)
and r(· | D) = r∗(· | D). These relative positions or conditional ranks are
kept fixed.
5 areas of future research
In epistemology ranking theory is a theory of belief and its revision.
It studies how an ideal doxastic agent should organize her beliefs and
conditional beliefs at a given moment in time, and how she should revise
her beliefs and conditional beliefs across time when she receives new
information.
In this entry we have distinguished between the following four cases
of belief revision. The case where the new information comes in the
qualitative form of a sentence or proposition of the agent’s language or
algebra, as in the AGM theory of belief revision. The case where the new
information comes in the comparative form of the relative positions of
an input sentence and a reference sentence, as in two-dimensional belief
revision. The case where the new information comes in the quantitative
form of new grades of disbelief for various propositions, as in the case
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Figure 6: Sophia’s ranking functions depicted as “numbered onions” with empty
layers
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of update rules 1 and 2 of ranking theory. And the case where the new
information comes in the quantitative form of differences between the
old and new grades of disbelief for such sentences or propositions, as in
update rule 3 of ranking theory.
Let us call information that concerns only individual sentences or propo-
sitions of the agent’s language or algebra factual information, and the corre-
sponding changes in belief factual belief changes. In this entry we have only
discussed factual information and factual belief changes. Besides these
there are at least two other forms of information an ideal doxastic agent
can receive and, corresponding to these, at least two forms of non-factual
belief change. I will briefly mention these and then I will conclude by
mentioning applications of ranking theory outside epistemology, in the
philosophy of science, in metaphysics, and in the philosophy of language.
The first of these non-factual belief changes takes place when the ideal
doxastic agent learns that her language or algebra was too poor or coarse-
grained. For instance, Sophia may start out with a language that allows her
to distinguish between red wine and white wine, and then may acquire
the concept of rosé. Or she may learn that among the red wines one can
distinguish between barriques and non-barriques. When the ideal doxastic
agent receives such conceptual information she should perform a conceptual
belief change. A prominent conceptual change is that of logical learning. In
the syntactic AGM framework logical learning is normally studied in
terms of belief bases (Hansson, 1999). Belief bases differ from belief sets by
not being required to be closed under the logical consequence relation.
Huber (2015a) shows how logical learning, and conceptual belief changes
in general, can be dealt with in the semantic framework of ranking theory.
Another form of non-factual information is meta-information, and an
ideal doxastic agent receiving meta-information should perform a meta-
belief change (Stalnaker, 2009). Information about her own doxastic state,
as well as about (in-) dependencies among propositions, as reported by
indicative conditionals, causal claims, and counterfactual conditionals,
may be a form of meta-information. In the syntactic AGM framework one
might be able to study meta-changes with the help of dynamic doxastic
logic, DDL (Segerberg 1995; Lindström and Rabinowicz 1999; Caie, this
volume). DDL allows one to reason about one’s own beliefs. In the semantic
framework of ranking theory reasoning about one’s own beliefs has been
studied by Spohn (2012, chaper 9) based on Hild (1998). Huber (2015a)
shows how indicative conditionals can be learned in ranking theory.
In the philosophy of language Spohn (2013, 2015) uses ranking theory
to develop a unified theory of indicative, counterfactual, and many other
conditionals. On this expressivist account most conditionals express con-
ditional beliefs, but counterfactuals express propositions relative to the
agent’s conditional beliefs and a partition. Huber (2014b, 2017) introduces
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so-called alethic ranking functions and defines counterfactuals in terms of
them. Raidl (forthcoming) proves completeness results for these and other
semantics, and corrects mistakes in Huber (2014b, 2015b, 2017). Alethic
ranking functions are related to subjective ranking functions by “the royal
rule.” This is a normative principle that constrains a priori subjective ranks
by alethic ranks much like Lewis (1980)’s principal principle constrains a
priori subjective credences by objective chances. Huber (2017) show the
royal rule to be the necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive
end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and
true beliefs in purely modal propositions. The philosophical background
for this is an idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality that contrasts
with the projectivist account of the metaphysical modalities of chance and
necessity developed by Spohn (2010a).
In metaphysics Spohn (1983, 2006a) uses ranking theory to develop a
theory of causation. This theory works with subjective ranking functions,
and so results in a subjective notion of causation, although there are at-
tempts at objectification (Spohn, 1993, 2012, chapter 15). Huber (2011) uses
the above-mentioned alethic ranking functions to arrive at a counterfactual
notion of causation. The conditional nature of ranking functions and a
precisification of Lewis’ (1979, p. 472) “system of weights or priorities”
allow Huber (2013c) to unify the two modalities of so-called “extended
causal models” (Halpern 2008; Halpern and Hitchcock 2010) into the one
modality of alethic ranking functions. Spohn (2010b) relates ranking theory
and causal models in a very different way.
In the philosophy of science Spohn explicates ceteris paribus conditions
(Spohn, 2002, 2014) and laws (Spohn, 2005) in terms of subjective ranking
functions. Huber (2015b) shows how the statistical notion of modes can be
used to empirically confirm the above-mentioned counterfactuals that are
defined in terms of alethic ranking functions.
None of this compares to Spohn (2012), which is the most comprehen-
sive treatment of ranking theory, and an invaluable resource for formal
epistemology full of philosophical insights.
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